I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") instituted a border enforcement policy aimed at deterring illegal immigration along strategic points of the United States' southern border by increasing the presence of border patrol agents and constructing physical barriers. 3 The INS anticipated that securing conventional routes of entry would force illegal immigrants to more remote and rugged sections of the border that would be more difficult to traverse. 4 The ultimate success of the policy has been debated, but it did result in a substantial decrease of illegal entries in places like San Diego, California and El Paso, Texas. 5 As anticipated, the number of attempted illegal entries also increased along more remote sections of the border, although it is unclear that the inhospitable terrain has deterred significant numbers of illegal immigrants from crossing the border.
One result of the increased activity along remote sections of the border has been the environmental degradation of federally managed lands, including vast amounts of trash, human waste, abandoned cars, wildfires, and the creation of hundreds of new footpaths. 6 The environmental effects of illegal immigration are of sufficient concern that one government official has opined, " [T] he best thing you can do for the environment [in Arizona] is to have control of the border." 7 Congress is seeking to control the southern border of the United States through the construction of hundreds of miles of fencing. 8 A fence may mitigate some of the environmental damage resulting from illegal immigration, but conservationists fear that it will also create irreversible damage to the border region's unique ecosystems. 9 Despite the warnings of conservationists and scientists regarding the ecological consequences of fence construction, Former Secretary of Homeland Security ("SHS"), Michael Chertoff, has exercised his authority to waive compliance with environmental laws, pursuant to Title I, § 102 of the REAL ID Act on five occasions. 10 The bottom line is this: We will continue to use the authority that Congress gave this department in a way that's sensitive to local concerns, that is mindful of the need to protect the environment, but that does not allow the process of securing the border to get bogged down in endless litigation or procedural wrangling that will result in years going by before we complete the mission that Congress has mandated and that the American people rightfully expect us to get done. Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Remarks by Homeland Sec. Sec'y Michael Chertoff on the State of Immigration (Nov. 6, 2007) fencing, by far the largest area affected by such a waiver, in parts of California, Arizona and Texas. 11 This note discusses the fence construction along the U.S.-Mexico border and contends that the authority given to the SHS to bypass environmental regulations to ensure expeditious construction in the REAL ID Act of 2005 should be amended. Part II traces the history of the waiver authority from its origin in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") to its current expansive scope as reflected in the REAL ID Act of 2005. Part III argues that the waiver authority is unnecessary because existing environmental legislation, specifically the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), gives adequate consideration to a federal agency's objectives while also balancing the environmental effects of pursuing those objectives. Part IV presents a case study of the role of NEPA in the construction of the Alaskan pipeline and offers it as an example of how NEPA could play a valuable role in fence construction along the U.S.-Mexico border. Part V addresses the arguments that are most frequently proffered as justification for the broad scope of the waiver authority. Finally, the note concludes by calling on Congress to amend the broad waiver authority given to the SHS by requiring that federal agencies comply with NEPA on those stretches of the fence that have not yet been completed.
II. THE WAIVER AUTHORITY: A FREE PASS ON COMPLIANCE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
The construction of a fence along the southern border of the United States is a massive project intended to stretch nearly 700 miles in length and for which Congress has authorized 2.7 billion dollars in funds. 12 Despite the ecological and historical uniqueness of much of this land, 13 the SHS possesses the authority to waive all legal regulations concerning it, including environmental laws, if such regulations are related to construction of the fence.
14 The original waiver power was given to the Attorney General pursuant to § 102(c) of IIRIRA, 15 and its use was limited to the waiver of NEPA and the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") in furtherance of the construction of barriers along the United States' border with Mexico. 16 The INS (later the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol) never invoked the waiver authority of § 102(c) of the IIRIRA, and continued to comply with both NEPA and the ESA.
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In May of 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act, 18 which amended the waiver authority of IIRIRA § 102(c) by expanding its scope in two significant ways.
19 First, the REAL ID Act waiver deleted references to NEPA and the ESA, and replaced it with language permitting the SHS 20 to waive all "legal requirements" in order to construct barriers at the border. 21 The second expansion of the waiver authority under the REAL ID Act prohibited judicial review of the waiver unless the review involves a constitutional matter. 22 The language of the amended waiver authority in the REAL ID Act is expansive to a degree that rarely is seen in federal legislation. 23 The only limitation on the use of the waiver is that it be exercised in relation to the "expeditious construction" of the barriers along the border. 24 The SHS may exercise the waiver authority at any time in the agency's decision-making process, but until he or she invokes the waiver the agency must continue to comply with all relevant legal requirements. 25 The waiver authority permits the SHS to act unilaterally in furthering construction of a fence without concern for the ramifications on the environment and communities along the U.S.-Mexico border. It is the contention of this note that Congress should amend the waiver authority to require compliance with NEPA, so that fence construction will proceed in a manner that considers both the immigration interests of the U.S. government and the environmental interests of conservationists and landowners along the southern border of the United States. According to the principle sponsor of NEPA, Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA), the legislation's purpose was to create "institutions and procedures" designed to "anticipate environmental problems." 27 NEPA respects the primary mission of respective government agencies and recognizes that those agencies are concerned foremost with their particular mission, whether it is immigration, energy or labor. 28 But, the legislation also recognizes that environmental issues affect Americans individually, as well as collectively, and thus requires agencies to give sufficient consideration to the environmental consequences resulting from their projects. NEPA is designed to create a balancing of those interests, not an inevitable outcome in favor of either a federal agency or environmental concerns. 29 An agency's consideration of the environmental effects of its actions is mandated primarily through Title I, § 102(2) of the act, which has been referred to as the "'action forcing' provision of NEPA."
30 Specifically, § 102(2)(C) requires agencies to provide an environmental impact statement ("EIS") for "major [f]ederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 31 An EIS should address specific topics such as the environmental impact of the proposed action, adverse environmental effects that are unavoidable if the project is implemented, alternatives to the proposed actions, the relationship between short-term use of the environment and maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action, should it be implemented.
32
Since its enactment, the case law addressing NEPA has identified the "twin aims" of § 102(2)(C), which ensure that the larger purpose of NEPA is met. 41. "If citizens did not have the right to go to court to enforce NEPA, I think it is fair to presume that the law would quickly become a virtual dead letter." Robert G. Dreher, Deputy Executive Dir. of making process, not merely "as an abstract exercise," but "as part of the agency's process of deciding whether to pursue a particular federal action." 34 This requirement affirms NEPA's implicit assumption that changes to the environment affect entire communities and regions and are therefore of great importance. 35 Agency interests often are politically driven and thus short-term in their approach, while environmental concerns often are long-term in their consequences. The procedural requirement of § 102(2)(C) mandates that federal agencies orient their decision-making to a long-term perspective by calling for serious consideration of the effects of proposed action in an EIS. 36 Thus, the fundamental purpose of the procedural requirement is to shape the decision-making process of federal agencies when they undertake significant projects by requiring them to analyze the environmental impact of such projects and any viable alternatives. 37 Second, § 102(2)(C) serves a disclosure function by requiring that the EIS produced by the agency be made available to the public. 38 The disclosure function of the EIS is significant in several respects. It provides the public with an opportunity to learn of an agency's proposed action. The disclosure function also provides the general public an opportunity to comment on proposed agency action and thereby influences the agency's decision-making process.
39 This is important when environmental issues are at stake because local residents and scientists often can provide valuable insights to proposed action based on their familiarity with the geographic area in question. 40 Finally, the disclosure function permits individuals and groups to resort to the legal system when an agency has not complied sufficiently or meaningfully with NEPA requirements. This enforcement mechanism ensures that NEPA does not devolve into a "virtual dead letter." 
A. The Alaskan Pipeline
In late 1967, evidence of oil was found in Alaska's North Slopes. 42 By the following spring, the discovery of oil was confirmed to be about 10 billion barrels-the largest ever in the United States. 43 The state of Alaska leased the land to three principle oil companies in 1969, and they wanted to extract oil from the ground as quickly as possible. 44 Others, however, raised concerns that the oil companies' haste could lead to devastating environmental consequences. 45 In particular, conservation and environmental groups opposed the oil companies' plans to transport oil through a pipeline that was to stretch nearly 800 miles from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez. The proposed pipeline was to run through federally controlled land, and thus the oil companies needed permission from the Department of Interior ("DOI") before beginning construction. 46 Before the permits could be granted, conservation groups filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief based, in part, on NEPA. 47 The district court granted a preliminary injunction on the pipeline construction. 48 In response to the preliminary injunction, the DOI was forced to consider the environmental consequences of pipeline construction and eventually released its findings in a six-volume EIS. 49 The drafting of the EIS also resulted in hearings that permitted members of the general public, including members of 50. ROSS, supra note 42, at 153. 51. Id. at 151. 52. The groups contended that the EIS did not address the alternative of a pipeline that would run through Canada. This was an attractive alternative for many environmentalists because it would utilize an existing pipeline but was disfavored by the oil companies as well as some politicians and economists who felt that it would subject the companies to more government regulation and Canadian taxes. the Alaskan Conservation Society, the Sierra Club and representatives of commercial fisheries, to voice concerns about the proposed project.
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Environmental groups filed another lawsuit in 1971, this time seeking a permanent injunction of the pipeline construction.
51 They were not satisfied that the EIS released by the DOI gave adequate consideration to alternate means of transporting the oil. 52 The district court denied the permanent injunction and dissolved the temporary injunction that had previously been granted. 53 The ruling was appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals where the court did not address the NEPA arguments, finding that the NEPA issues were not "ripe for consideration." 54 The court did, however, grant the permanent injunction on other grounds. 55 World events intervened in 1973 when OPEC imposed an oil embargo and created concerns of an impending energy crisis in the United States. 56 As the international situation changed, supporters of the pipeline shifted the conversation from the environmental impact of the project to concerns about the United States' energy policy and how growing dependence on foreign oil was "placing our national security in jeopardy." 57 In 1973, Congress passed an amendment that accepted the EIS submitted by the DOI on the proposed pipeline and prevented further judicial action under NEPA. 58 The bill narrowly passed in the Senate where Vice President Spiro Agnew cast the deciding vote. 61. One oil executive stated, "the conservationists are one of the best things that could have happened to us . . . [our] aim is to make money. Until recently it was to our advantage to run a sloppy operation because no one was enforcing the rules." ROSS, supra note 42, at 152. "Although the pipeline was ultimately built, following congressional passage of further legislation, the early litigation transformed pipeline planning. Planning, as delayed, became far more deliberate and careful. As industry representatives later acknowledged, if the early plans had been followed, it might well have been an economic and environmental disaster. applauded the role that NEPA played in the pipeline construction. 60 The judicial review of NEPA that occurred forced the DOI to produce an EIS and inform the public of its considered actions. Subsequent statements from oil executives involved in the pipeline suggest that the requirements of NEPA influenced their behavior and gave rise to thoughtful planning that otherwise would have been bypassed in favor of the quickest and cheapest means of construction. 61 Two of the most important modifications to the pipeline construction that resulted from NEPA-related litigation, and which were incorporated in the 1973 congressional amendment, were the burying of stretches of the pipeline so as not to disrupt wildlife and directives to "bury pipe in such a way as to lessen the adverse effect on the permafrost."
62 NEPA led to a balancing of agency interests and environmental concerns in the Alaskan pipeline construction that likely would not have occurred in the absence of the legislation. NEPA, however, is not playing the same role in the construction of a fence along the U.S.-Mexico border, a project that bears similarities to the Alaskan pipeline.
B. Fence Construction

Environmental Concerns
Congress mandated the construction of a fence along 700 miles of the U.S. Another endangered species, the ocelot, could be affected by the construction of a border fence. The current ocelot population is limited to two families in the Lower Rio Grande Valley National Wildlife Refuge, near the southeast section of the border in Texas. 68 Conservationists fear that a fence would restrict mating populations among a species that is already very limited in number.
69 A fence also would cut off some animals from the Rio Grande, which acts as the only source of fresh water in some parts of Texas.
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Among smaller animals, conservationists voice concerns about the effects of a fence on birds. The southwestern United States contains one of the most diverse bird populations in the world. 71 In the Rio Grande National Wildlife Refuge alone, there are 500 species of birds.
72 By destroying hundreds of miles of habitat conservationists predict that fencing would interfere with the birds' nesting and migratory patterns. 73 Bright floodlights placed on top of a border fence could disrupt the migratory patterns of birds that navigate by means of moonlight and "interfere with the reproduction cycle of the cacti" by "attract [ing] insects that are responsible for pollinating cactus." 74 Conservationists also are concerned about the effects of a border fence on the land itself. The fence would disturb existing hydrologic patterns in areas "where the percolation of just inches of water is vital for the maintenance of grasses and plants and different types of cacti." 75 The fence already has been blamed for two flooding incidents in Arizona in which the natural flow of heavy rainwater was dammed by the fence and up to seven feet of water collected along the structure. 76 The creation of dirt roads to be used by large equipment required to construct the fence could lead to further flooding and erosion problems. 77 Such damage would be devastating to federally owned land near the Rio Grande River in southwest Texas. 78 Over the past two decades, the government has spent roughly $80 million dollars in attempts to re-vegetate this land and create wildlife refuges, efforts that largely could be reversed if the fence is constructed. 
The Waiver Authority and Fence Construction in San Pedro Riparian National Conservation Area
Fence construction is under the authority of the DHS, but in San Pedro, because the fence runs through federally operated land, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") was responsible for conducting the environmental studies involving fence construction. 80 The BLM completed an environmental assessment on the approximately two-mile stretch of proposed fencing in San Pedro, which was subsequently the subject of Secretary Chertoff's waiver, in a span of three weeks and without public comment. 81 Much like the conservation groups involved in the Alaskan pipeline litigation, the Sierra Club and Defenders of Wildlife filed suit in the federal district court of the District of Columbia, seeking a temporary injunction to the fence construction on the grounds that the BLM did not prepare an adequate EIS.
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The temporary injunction was granted. 83 On October 26, 2007, about two weeks after the temporary injunction was granted, Secretary Chertoff announced that he was invoking his waiver authority under the REAL ID Act, 84 thereby permitting construction of the fence to continue without complying with twenty laws, half of which are closely related to environmental concerns. 85 The exercise of the waiver authority prohibited further judicial review of the case, except for constitutional challenges. 86 The plaintiffs in the original suit amended their complaint subsequent to the invocation of the waiver, arguing that the waiver was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to the executive branch. 87 The district court rejected this argument. It found that the congressional grant of power to the SHS in § 102(c) of the REAL ID Act to waive legal requirements when "necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads under [section 102 of IIRIRA] . . . in the vicinity of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United States" articulated an intelligible principle and was therefore constitutional. 88 In June of 2008, the conservation groups exhausted all available forms of judicial review of the waiver when the United States Supreme Court refused to grant writ of certiorari on the question of the constitutionality of the waiver authority given to the SHS in the Secure Fence Act of 2006. 89 Fence construction has continued and as of the end of August 2008, approximately half of the border fence was completed.
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While the pipeline ended in favor of federal agencies, NEPA permitted environmentalists to voice valid concerns before the massive pipeline project was undertaken. In the case of the fence, Congress has abolished the careful balancing of agency and environmental interest achieved through NEPA and given the SHS the unilateral power to decide when its objectives should prevail over environmental concerns. While it is true that the DHS must continue to comply with all legal requirements before invoking the waiver, the case of San Pedro demonstrates that this is little consolation to those concerned with the environmental effects of fence construction. The procedural function of NEPA technically was met by BLM in issuing an EIS, but conservation groups lamented that the three weeks taken for the study of the environmental impact of the fence was woefully inadequate. Additionally, the disclosure function of NEPA was not met because the public was deprived of the opportunity to comment on the project. 91 Through the use of judicial review, conservation groups sought enforcement of NEPA in the courts. Yet, when a federal judge granted a preliminary injunction, which would have required NEPA's balancing of agency and environmental interests, the SHS invoked the wavier. Unlike the case of the Alaska pipeline, where the delay brought about by judicial review of agency compliance with NEPA resulted in concessions by federal agencies and the oil companies, DHS does not need to cooperate with conservationists in finding appropriate concessions that will further the interests of both sides. Advocates of the waiver authority contend that bypassing environmental regulations is justified because of the import of the issues at stake in fence construction.
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92. Similarly, backers of the Alaskan pipeline argued that the project needed to proceed due to the energy dependence of the United States on oil suppliers in the Middle East, which was inextricably linked to issues of national security. ROSS, supra note 42, at 155. 
V. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE WAIVER AUTHORITY?
A. National Security
The broad waiver authority given to the SHS usually is justified on the grounds of national security. 92 Secretary Chertoff has stated that the contention over the construction of a border fence ". . . is a classic example of how we have a conflict between the needs of national and homeland security on the one hand and environmental concerns on the other."
93 After the World Trade Center bombings in 1993, and particularly since September 11, 2001 , there has been considerable debate about how to prevent terrorists from entering the country. Some have argued that one of the Unites States' greatest vulnerabilities in the war against terror is its porous border with Mexico. 94 While the northern border of the United States and its coastlines also provide opportunities of illegal entry for terrorists, the vast number of individuals that illegally enter the United States do so through its southern border, raising fears that terrorists, too, could easily enter the country. 95 These fears are enhanced by the existence of human smugglers who bring individuals to the United States and by increasing ties between terrorist organizations and drug smugglers. 96 The illegal entry of terrorists via the U.S.-Mexico border certainly is plausible, but evidence collected to date suggests that the northern border of the U.S. is of greater concern in regards to terrorists gaining entry to the United States. 97 The proposition that a fence along the U.S.-Mexico border will do little to protect against the presence of terrorists in the United States also is supported by evidence showing that the presence of terrorists in the United States may be due to lack of interior enforcement, not border enforcement. A study conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center reveals that almost half of the twelve million people in the United States illegally arrived in the country legally and became illegal only after overstaying their visas. 100 All nineteen terrorists involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks entered the United States through ports of entry, not by illegal entry over the border, and at least six of them had overstayed their visas. 101 These statistics further suggest that terrorist exploitation of existing immigration policies and weak interior enforcement are of greater concern than illegal entry into the United States at its southern border.
B. Stemming the Flow of Illegal Immigrants
The contentious nature of the debate over illegal immigration in the United States was reflected in the Senate's failure to pass comprehensive immigration reform in June of 2007. 102 Opponents of the bill argued that the proposed reforms were meaningless without first securing the nation's borders. 103 Whether a border fence would significantly strengthen the ability of the U.S. government to secure its borders remains unclear. 104 seconds.
112 Another criticism of the fence is that it may push illegal immigrants to utilize miles of existing drainage tunnels around the border or to create more tunnels. 113 Finally, some individuals believe that the fence fails to address the fundamental issues that fuel illegal immigration to the United States, and therefore that proponents of the fence grossly underestimate the risks individuals will take to find work in the United States. 114 Former Governor Janet Napolitano (D-AZ), now the SHS in President Barack Obama's administration, aptly summarized this position with this statement, "You show me a 50-foot wall, I'll show you a 51-foot ladder." 115 Supporters of this approach argue that secure borders cannot be achieved without simultaneous comprehensive immigration reform that addresses the underlying economic reasons driving illegal immigration. 116 In light of the many concerns raised about the effectiveness of a fence, the price tag of 700 miles of fencing is disconcerting. Congress originally authorized $1.2 billion dollars for fence construction; 117 however, estimates have placed the final cost of the fencing at closer to six billion dollars. 118 Maintenance and repair of the fence will continue to be a source of great expenditure for the federal government. The Corps of Engineers has estimated "that the 25-year life cycle cost of the fence would range from $16.4 million to $70 million per mile depending on the amount of damage sustained by the fencing." 119 The minimal deterrence to illegal immigration provided by the border fence does not justify its exorbitant cost and provides another incentive, aside from its environmental effects, for the federal government to consider alternative means for addressing illegal immigration. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In the absence of a compelling governmental purpose for a fence, there is serious reason to question the vast scope of the waiver authority in the REAL ID Act. When dealing with projects as large as a 700-mile fence, DHS should consider the long-term ramifications of its actions. In particular, the geographic location of the fence raises environmental concerns because of the fragility of the ecosystems involved and the potential number of endangered species that will be affected.
120 By circumventing environmental regulations like NEPA there is little incentive, and virtually no legal mechanism, to ensure that agencies consider the long-term impact of their proposed actions. The Alaskan pipeline illustrates the crucial role that NEPA played in bringing about concessions in the pipeline construction that mitigated environmental degradation of the Alaskan wilderness. In the case of the fence, its viability is questionable and there are alternatives that could potentially be as effective and which would reduce the environmental damage a fence would cause.
One alternative to a border fence that has been suggested in areas where the Rio Grande River acts as the border is to increase water levels by building a dam. 121 This would deter illegal immigration by creating a natural boundary, while also preserving water access for local animal populations. Mexican officials have encouraged the use of a natural border, including the use of cacti as "living fences."
122 Conservationists have promoted the use of certain man-made structures like vehicle barriers as an alternative to a fence. These have been installed in some border areas, like eastern San Diego County and Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument in southern Arizona, and prevent vehicles from entering the land, while still permitting most animals to roam the land and allowing for natural water flow.
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Others see technology as providing a more environmentally friendly alternative to a fence. Virtual fencing, including the use of radar, sensors, and cameras, could help border patrol agents monitor miles of the border from a central location. 124 The new technology that a virtual fence would utilize still faces challenges, although the federal government has given conditional approval for 28 miles of virtual fencing in Arizona, and could prove to be costly. 125 It is unclear where virtual fencing could act as a viable alternative to a fence along the U.S.-Mexico border, but without having to comply with NEPA, DHS does not need to give serious consideration to the question. 126 Because of the potential environmental effects of a fence, and the minimal advantage it will provide in increasing national security and preventing illegal immigration, Congress should act to amend the unilateral waiver authority given to the SHS in IIRIRA as amended by the REAL ID Act. Congress has shown the political will to construct a fence, but that project should be subject to the same study and consideration that all other federal agency projects are, particularly because of the vast size of a border fence. The fence originally was scheduled to be completed by the end of 2008, but as of September of 2008, doubts remained about the practicality of meeting the deadline, particularly as DHS requested an additional $400 million from Congress in order to continue with fence construction. 127 The slowing progress of fence construction means that Congress can still act to amend the waiver authority and to permit the balancing of interests that follows from compliance with the NEPA for the portion of the fence that remains to be constructed.
The example of the Alaskan pipeline illustrates the importance of considering environmental effects of federal agency projects before they are undertaken. If they are not, long-term or even permanent environmental damage to an area of ecological richness will suffer the consequences of shortsighted agency decisions. Congress should require DHS, and any other federal agencies participating in fence construction, to be subject to NEPA. This should include the reinstatement of full judicial review to ensure NEPA
